[Scan-DC] The Case Against Public Safety Radio Traffic Encryption

[Alan Henney]

Here is an interesting discussion on keeping police dispatch channels
unencrypted by retired Fx Co. PD Major Leonzo Williams...


*The Case Against Public Safety Radio Traffic Encryption*

*Leonzo* *G. Williams; Major (Ret.), Fairfax County VA Police Department *

Many local law enforcement agencies across the United States have encrypted
all of their radio traffic including routine dispatch, special tactical
channels, and training channels. They claim that it “enhances” the safety
of first responders and citizens. Although changes in technology allow for
encryption at little or no cost, agencies that are implementing it are
relying on the unproven assumption that encryption is better for citizens
and public safety personnel.

American law enforcement agencies trace their roots to Sir Robert Peel, a 19
th century British statesman. He established the first modern law
enforcement agency in London. Peel had nine principles on which he based
the establishment of an ethical police force. Among them were the
following:

   - “The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon
   public approval of police actions.
   - Police must secure the willing cooperation of the public in voluntary
   observance of the law to be able to secure and maintain the respect of the
   public.
   - Police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public
   that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public
   and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public
   who are paid to give full time and attention to duties which are incumbent
   on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.”

   So, what does all of that have to do with encryption? Everything! Robert
   Peel’s point is that police agencies are a part of the public that
   *serves* the public; it is their tax dollars that enable law enforcement
   agencies to purchase, operate, and maintain equipment including radios and
   other communication devices. American democracy values freedom and
   encourages transparency in government operations. Citizens value local
   independence and control, as evidenced by the absence of a national police
   force in favor of the establishment of thousands of locally run police
   forces throughout the country.

   We allow citizens to gather information from law enforcement agencies
   through Freedom of Information Acts requests and other methods. Law
   enforcement agencies disseminate information via press briefings, websites,
   social media, and the release of statistical information. Law enforcement
   agencies have established neighborhood watch groups, citizen academies,
   auxiliary programs and other community outreach activities to further
   promote positive interactions with the citizens that they serve.

   In this context, full encryption of all police radio systems in the
   United States runs counter to everything that U.S. law enforcement has
   historically stood for since its founding under Peel’s principles.

   Given the number of local, regional, state, and federal law enforcement
   agencies, along with fire and rescue departments engaged in public safety
   activities, full encryption is already proving to be a major hindrance to
   radio interoperability (i.e., the ability of devices to exchange
   information). During times of crisis, there may be non-governmental
   agencies, working closely with first responders, who may also need to
   monitor public safety frequencies. When full encryption is implemented,
   interoperability ceases. It returns us to the days when radio dispatch
   centers called other dispatch centers on the telephone to relay critical,
   time-sensitive information; agencies are becoming again unable to directly
   communicate with one another due to incompatible encrypted radio channels.


   On January 13, 1982, Air Florida flight 90 crashed on takeoff from
   National Airport into the Potomac River, which separates Washington, D.C.
   from the State of Virginia. Multiple public safety agencies responded to
   the crash, including the (D.C.) Metropolitan Police Department., U.S. Park
   P.D., Arlington County P.D., and the Metropolitan Airports Authority P.D.
   Also responding were the Washington, D.C. fire department, the Metropolitan
   Washington Airports Authority F.D., the Arlington County F.D., Alexandria
   City F.D., and Fairfax County F.D.

   One of the major impediments to the rescue operation was a lack of radio
   interoperability. From that disaster, first responders came together to
   develop shared radio systems with digital mobile radio talkgroups (A DMR
   talkgroup is like a single frequency that allows a conversation to take
   place between separate users). That way, a majority of Washington, D.C.
   area public safety agencies were able to share radio talkgroups, allowing
   different jurisdictional agencies to communicate in real time as a
   situation dictated. That ability proved invaluable on September 11, 2001,
   when multiple agencies were needed to respond to the disaster at the
   Pentagon and, the absence of encryption, enabled all agencies to
   communicate directly and in real time.

   Now, those same agencies are seriously considering dismantling this
   capability with a headlong rush into encryption. While it can be argued
   that if everyone becomes encrypted, all relevant agencies could share
   encryption keys, allowing them the ability to communicate with each other,
   the reality is in a crisis situations both government and  nongovernmental
   entities would be left out of the encrypted communication loop and unable
   to assist public safety agencies. The cost of encryption is not so much
   financial as it is societal; encryption limits citizen engagement and
   cooperation.

   Also lost is situational awareness among agencies. Before encryption,
   many stakeholders routinely monitored each other’s public safety channels.
   Fire departments monitored law enforcement channels to identify and
   evaluate events that might involve them.





   It was a passive, often informal monitoring, but it offered a great
   benefit. Off-duty personnel and civilian support personnel monitored their
   agencies or adjoining agencies. On-duty personnel, such as county police
   officers, could monitor the state troopers that worked in their county or
   vice versa. This type of monitoring allowed stakeholders to have greater
   situational awareness and supported a more robust response when needed.

   As more and more public safety agencies encrypt routine dispatch radio
   traffic, this awareness is diminishing. Fire department personnel are not
   aware of what their law enforcement colleagues are doing until the moment a
   call is made to fire dispatch. Even then, they only hear what their fire
   dispatcher tells them, which is only what the police dispatcher has relayed
   to the fire dispatcher via a phone call. Encryption hamstrings public
   safety personnel for whom additional background information would enhance
   performance.

   Much has been made regarding the media and encryption. Media outlets
   have sometimes rebroadcast public safety radio traffic without verifying
   it. On occasion, reporters have compromised law enforcement tactics in
   emergency situations. These incidents are unfortunate but not the norm.
   However, in response, some agency leaders have used them as additional
   reasons to fully encrypt their radio communications. They feel that
   preventing media outlets from monitoring public safety radio transmissions
   is good public policy.

   The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits
   government actions that infringe on the freedom of the press. In reality,
   how does the implementation of total public safety radio encryption square
   with the ability of members of the press to do their job? In practice, full
   encryption infringes upon their ability to perform their role as observers
   and reporters of government actions.

   Some agencies state that the safety of their personnel must outweigh the
   public’s desire to listen in real time to their department’s radio
   operations. Nevertheless, if you ask these same agency heads if guns should
   be banned to insure the safety of their personnel, many will cite the
   Second Amendment, which allows citizens to own guns. If they understand the
   rights granted by the Second Amendment, how can they not recognize the
   freedoms guaranteed by the First?

   Encryption does serve a valuable purpose in some circumstances. Radio
   traffic involving national security, presidential protection details,
   detective and narcotics operations, SWAT incidents and other tactical
   activities are exactly the types of communication that should be encrypted.
   Encrypting sensitive radio traffic helps maintain the safety of first
   responders and the public by limiting opportunities for that type of
   information to fall into the wrong hands.

   However, encryption does not serve a purpose in the day-to-day routine
   dispatch that makes up so much of public safety radio traffic. For an
   example a lot of law enforcement agencies establish, or support
   neighborhood watch groups.

   When an agency uses fulltime encryption, how can those groups or any
   taxpaying citizen become aware in real time of the situations occurring in
   their neighborhoods? It is meaningless for agencies to state they support
   neighborhood watch groups when encryption undermines citizens’ ability to
   be the extra set of eyes and ears for their neighborhoods.

   In jurisdictions using full encryption, news outlets without access to
   real time police radio communications can no longer report traffic jams or
   incidents in a timely manner; citizens who formerly used their scanners or
   internet streams of radio traffic to monitor routine police activity can no
   longer call in useful tips to law enforcement. The slogan, “if you see
   something, say something®” loses some of its value when interested
   citizens are left out of the communications loop.

   Full encryption breaks the bond between the community and the police as
   described by Peel. Citizens may question why police in a democracy feel the
   need to hide all of their radio traffic from the public. It is a fair
   question. Just as events in Ferguson, Missouri gave rise to concerns about
   the militarization of U.S. police officers, full encryption generates
   concerns about a governmental lack of transparency. The existence of the
   technology does not obligate its use if it negates the government’s
   responsibility to share information with its citizens.

   In the District of Columbia area, the Washington Metropolitan Police
   Department has encrypted all but one radio channel. However, they have not
   shown a correlation between encryption and a decrease in crime or an
   increase in arrests; they cannot demonstrate an impact on the safety of its
   officers. Yet, all of those criteria were cited as reasons for moving to
   full encryption. The only measurable difference has been the inability of
   citizens and other stakeholders to hear routine radio dispatch traffic!

   In addition, while much has been made of encryption as a tool to thwart
   acts of terrorism, there has been no clear nexus there either. The
   Washington, D.C. police department is encrypted; they were the major first
   responders to the Navy Yard shooting in 2013. Encryption did not deter the
   shooter. However, it did hamper radio communications in real time with
   other agencies called in to assist.

   Agency heads and policymakers should think long and hard before allowing
   our founding principles and beliefs to be trampled by limiting citizens’
   abilities to hear any police radio traffic in an exaggerated desire to
   “keep officers and citizens safe.” Agencies and the public should be
   looking for data to back up those claims. Has encryption enhanced public or
   officer safety? Has encryption provided quantifiable gains in a
   department’s number of criminal/incident reports or in the effectiveness of
   its other public safety activities?

   While there is clearly a role for encryption in public safety, it should
   be restricted to channels and talkgroups that deal with particularly
   sensitive situations and tactical matters. It should not be used for
   routine, regular dispatch.



   *Recommendations:*


   - Public safety administrators should carefully weigh the value of
   encryption against the significant negative impact to legitimate listeners
   of public safety radio traffic as well as to its impact on news gathering
   and traffic reporting organizations.
   - Public safety administrators should consider how encryption will
   affect their agency’s ability to communicate with neighboring jurisdictions.

   - Public safety administrators should make their decisions with the
   understanding that encryption is a tool that protects sensitive information
   from unwanted disclosure. However, its overuse can compromise the
   underlying elements of citizens’ trust and confidence in public safety.
   Agencies cannot operate in secrecy and expect to have public support. There
   must be transparency and accountability.
   - *For agencies that have already encrypted all of their radio
   communications:* it is suggested that you end encryption on the main
   dispatch channel so that citizens and the media can listen in real time to
   what their local public safety agencies are doing in their communities.
   - *In summation “democracy dies in silence”!*





   *About the Author *

   Leonzo “Lee” Williams began his 40-year law enforcement career in 1973
   in New Jersey. He first “retired” in 2005 as a major from the Fairfax
   County Virginia Police Department. He returned to full-time law enforcement
   in 2008, retiring a second time in 2016 as a lieutenant from the Loudoun
   County Virginia Sheriff Office.