Ray wrote:

I would measure the success of any system, including weapons, to be whether or not it achieved its objectives.   You are correct that losses were high, but did the bombing campaign achieve its goals?  

My reading about conditions in Germany at the end of the war seem to agree that the combined British and American bombing of cities, industries, energy, and transportation were quite effective.  A side objective was achieving air superiority through attrition, which reduced further strategic bomber losses and allowed amazing results by tactical ground-support weapons like the P-47 and its British and Soviet counterparts.  "Actung Jabo!"

Industrialists and leading bureaucrats report devastation and near complete shut-down by early 1945.  They were working on shifting production of last-ditch equipment to hidden, underground facilities, but they state that the skilled workers won't be available due to bombed-out residential areas.   Nor will transport or fuel be available.

They seem to feel if they "only had a little more time" they could turn it around, but the relentless nature of the bombing as well as the press of the war on the ground did not allow for more time.

You mentioned the B-29.  I've heard analyses that conclude the strategic bombing in Europe should have been slowed or paused because B-17 and B-24 losses were too high and the B-29 was "coming soon".  That is a case of 20/20 hindsight.  During the war no one knew the revolutionary technology involved in the B-29 would be a success, and it took about a year longer than expected to become reliable and effective. 

If they knew it would be a success, why did they invest in a complete, parallel development project in the Consolidated B-32 (which was trying to achieve similar design ideas in different ways)?