[Milsurplus] Fwd: Re: "Lancaster" - no copilot

[Joe Connor]

Not true at all, Mark. 
An examination of the songs that soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen made up during the war show that same kind of attitude, mocking their weapons, themselves and (especially) their commanders and often deprecating their own courage. It was often a very dark gallows humor. That particular one was collected and recorded by WWII vet Oscar Brand. 
Here's another about the transport pilots who flew fuel in dangerous supply missions over the Hump in the CBI theater and suffered a lot of operational fatalities. It was collected directly from those same pilots:
(Tune: Down in the Valley)This is the story 

Of a Hump pilot's life: 

For a gallon of gas, boys, 

He gave up his life.  

There is a moral, 

As you all can see. 

Our flying is useless, 

So listen to me: 

Don't bust your ass, boys, 

Tezgaon's next door; 

The Limies will help them;

So to hell with the war.

                    Joe Connor 

    On Wednesday, October 4, 2017 4:15 PM, Mark K3MSB <mark.k3msb at gmail.com> wrote:
 

 Sure; variants of the B-17 evolved to meet changing needs.   Why would that surprise anyone?

The G variant, and I believe the very end run of the F variant, had the twin 50 caliber guns in the chin turret.   Why wasn't it there before?  Because they didn't think they'd need it.   The nose turret was added to address changing Luftwaffe tactics.     Why did the Luftwaffe start increasing head on attacks?   Because the overlapping defensive fire coordination of large bomber formations was effective -- except from the frontal region.

The answer to the question of weather daylight precision bombing was effective is one that has been vigorously debated since the end of WW II.   The answer lies between the extremes of the two positions.
To say that your "poem" accurately represented how aircrews felt about the B-17 would put the burden of proof squarely upon your shoulders against the overwhelming testimony of history to the contrary.

73 Mark K3MSb





On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 3:38 PM, Joe Connor <joeconnor53 at yahoo.com> wrote:

Let's not forget that the B-17 was developed in 1935. At that time, the B-17 probably was fast enough to outrun enemy fighters, and was heavily armed enough to handle any fighters that got within range. By the start of the war and certainly by the time B-17s were deployed in Europe, neither of those things was true any longer. 
I read somewhere that the early B-17s didn't even have tail guns because there was no need for tail guns for a bomber that could outrun than any of the fighters that would attack it.
By the way, here's a song I encountered that was sung in the Eighth Air Force:
F**ck the Flying Fortress,And pray that we abort.I'd rather be back homeThan in a f**cking Flying Fort. 
Pity the poor tail gunnerHis space is mighty sparse,And when the landing gear retracts,He gets it up the arse. 
                Joe Connor 

    On Wednesday, October 4, 2017 3:27 PM, Mark K3MSB <mark.k3msb at gmail.com> wrote:
 

 Hi Ken --

I found the following:  “There were two dangerous andconnected fallacies underlying Bomber Command's confidence in it'sability to win the war through such a campaign of bombing. Thefirst was the belief that escorted bombers could survive in daylightagainst fighter defenses by using their multiple guns, mutualfire-support between aircraft, and their speed. Even in July 1939this policy was being questioned by the Commander-in-Chief of thebomber force, Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. Gunners, he noted, “have noreal confidence in their ability to use this equipment [poweredturrets] effectively, and captains and crews have little confidencein the ability of the gunners to protect them”....Even though someofficers blamed the losses on poor formation-keeping and flak ratherthan fighters – Harris, by January 1940 in command of 5 group,still believed after these losses that three bombers in company“considered themselves capable of taking on anything” - the factthat daylight operations were near suicidal was slowly driven home”“ From “AVRO Lancaster by Bill SweetmanLooking from the other side though,  the British did not employ the large formations that the USAAF did.    The large formations did provide better defensive / overlapping fire cover than occurred with a three ship formationThe British got their hats handed to them when they tried to use the B-17C in an offensive capacity.   Not only was the delivered C model (the British called it "Fortress I") not suitable for combat,  they did not employ the suggested large formations - because they didn't have enough planes.  Aside from this causing the British to incorrectly conclude that the B-17 was an inferior bomber, the results reinforced their belief that daylight bombing was too costly.   Good discussion of this in "Flying Fortress" by Edward Jablonski.
73 Mark K3MSB

On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 12:54 PM, Kenneth G. Gordon <kgordon2006 at frontier.com> wrote:

On 4 Oct 2017 at 12:27, Mark K3MSB wrote:

> My point was that I don't think the Lancaster was developed as a night
> bomber;  it transitioned to that role as a result of the loss rate for
> daylight bombing.

>From my reading, that is absolutely true.

Ken W7EKB

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