[Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
C.Whitaker
whitaker at pa.net
Wed Feb 13 10:36:37 EST 2013
de WB2CPN
It was a Sunday morning, the radar was still in the test stage,
The civilian contractors who were installing and testing the
radar were working only on week days.
On the Sunday of the attack two Army Air Corps maintenance
men there getting some extra experience.
They saw the radar echoes, and called it in to the Duty Officer
at Hickam. The person at Hickam verified that a flight
of aircraft was coming in from the States that day, so he told the
men at the radar site, "Your radar is working, It's only birds until
you pick up something larger. Don't worry about it."
It was a Lt. Berquist who said that.
He eventually made Brigadier General, (One Star), and I met him
while I was stationed in the 1962nd Communications Group at
Kadena in 1963. He was making his final world-tour before he
retired. Elements of his command were all over.
He was awarded a permanent nick-name on December 7, 1941.
"Birdquist".
Trivia, but the AF communications people, by whatever name their
Major Command was called, passed their lore along as time went
by. I suppose you've heard about the B-24 that was lost in the
Libyan desert in WWII. There's a true story about that, just as there
is one about the radar in Hawaii, and General Berquist's involvement
with it. And there are others. USAF retired me in 1966.
73 Clete
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
On 2/12/2013 5:31 PM, Ray Chase wrote:
> There are a multitude of misconceptions about the development and use
> of radar in and prior to WWII. The Brits did not invent it. As it
> turns out a German by the name of Christian Hulsmeyer patented a crude
> form of radar in 1904 and it actually worked of sorts, but nothing
> came of it. In the mid 1930's at least five major countries were all
> working on radar in utmost secrecy. By 1939/40 America and Germany
> both had more technologically advanced radars than the UK but England
> facing immediate attack had organized a very effective command and
> control system that made excellent use of their rudimentary Chain Home
> system. The U.S did have an effective SCR-270 long range radar in
> operation at pearl harbor that tracked the incoming Japanese attack
> for over 20 minutes. The Japanese planes actually few over the radar
> site. Unfortunately command and control was just being set up so the
> warning was written off by a simple retort; "don't worry about it".
> The Lieutenant who made that remark went on to serve a full military
> career and retired as a Lt. Colonel. As others have said; radar was
> new and not well understood by most in command but we learned fast,
> especially in the Navy where it was rapidly put to use during ensuing
> Naval battles. Oh yes, there was radar at Clark field and its
> information was not utilized. BTW, the Japanese captured an intact
> SCR-268 Searchlight radar at Wake, took it home and built copies of
> it. Fortunately the Japanese were more hidebound in adopting radar
> until it was too late in the war.
> Ray Chase, InfoAge
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: "Joe Connor" <joeconnor53 at yahoo.com>
> To: "Ray Fantini" <RAFANTINI at salisbury.edu>; <milsurplus at mailman.qth.net>
> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 12:13 PM
> Subject: Re: [Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
>
>
>> Ray, your points are well taken, as are John's. Once we had decisive
>> battles like Coral Sea and Midway, where the capital ships never even
>> saw each other, even the older admirals realized the day of the
>> battleship had ended. Their main role would be using their big guns
>> to support landings.
>>
>> If I remember correctly, there was a modern radar unit on Oahu
>> (SCR-270?) and it did pick up the incoming Japanese planes. However,
>> it was mistakenly believed that it was a flight of B-17s flying in
>> from the west coast. I'm not sure if that was a function of poor
>> equipment, poor use of the equipment, poor command use of the
>> information the radar unit produced, or a peacetime mentality that
>> could not conceive of the Japanese having the audacity to attack
>> Pearl Harbor.
>>
>> If I remember correctly, there was at least one radar unit near Clark
>> Field in the Philippines. In the days immediately before the war, the
>> Japanese flew over Luzon at night. Our radar picked them up and
>> fighters (I guess they were called pursuits back then) scrambled to
>> intercept them. Our pursuits never found the intruders. The radar
>> didn't detect the attacks that obliterated Clark Field and the Cavite
>> Naval Base in the first few days of the war. Again, I'm not sure if
>> the fault lies with the equipment, the operators, the command or a
>> peacetime mentality.
>>
>> Joe Connor
>>
>>
>>
>>> ________________________________
>>> From: Ray Fantini <RAFANTINI at salisbury.edu>
>>> To: Joe Connor <joeconnor53 at yahoo.com>; "Military Surplus Mail List
>>> (milsurplus at mailman.qth.net)" <milsurplus at mailman.qth.net>
>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 11:45 AM
>>> Subject: RE: [Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
>>>
>>>
>>> Still think you have to consider the whole Japanese concept of the
>>> decisive battle and how deeply it is ingrained in many of their
>>> actions, also perhaps it just human nature that in every war people
>>> start out with the idea that it’s going to be just like the last war
>>> and often hold on to obsolete tactics. It’s easy for us today to see
>>> the aircraft carrier as the ultimate weapon system but think many as
>>> late as pearl harbor or afterwards still held on the outmoded belief
>>> that the battleship was king. Maybe at the battle of the Coral Sea
>>> and definitely by Midway everyone knew that the day of the
>>> battleship was thru but before the war bet there were many
>>> battleship proponents, after all how much did japan spend on
>>> building Yamoto and Musahi?
>>> I would think an interesting point to look at is the differences
>>> between the poor use of radar and communications that was presented
>>> at Pearl Harbor and how by the battle of the Coral Sea we had
>>> developed the capability to spot incoming flight by radar and vector
>>> intercept aircraft to attack incoming flights before reaching our
>>> carriers. Great example of command, control and communications just
>>> five months after pearl harbor.
>>>
>>> RF
>>>
>>> From:Joe Connor [mailto:joeconnor53 at yahoo.com]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 11:11 AM
>>> To: Ray Fantini; Military Surplus Mail List
>>> (milsurplus at mailman.qth.net)
>>> Subject: Re: [Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
>>>
>>> Short-term, yes; long-term, no.
>>>
>>> Yamamoto had traveled in the U.S. and understood our potential
>>> industrial might better than any other Japanese leader. He knew that
>>> he could run wild for the first six months of the war, before we
>>> could harness our industrial strength. He was understandably wary of
>>> "waking the sleeping giant." Therefore, he knew he needed a
>>> knock-out punch at Pearl Harbor. He scored a knock-down, not a
>>> knock-out.
>>>
>>> The psychological effects of the attack are interesting, too. On the
>>> one hand, the sneak attack rallied the American people like nothing
>>> else could have done. On the other hand, it scared the crap out of
>>> our admirals. The resulting timidity cost us any chance to relieve
>>> or reinforce Wake Island and any chance to bring badly needed help
>>> to the Philippines.(By the time of Coral Sea and Midway, of course,
>>> Nimitz had gone a long way towards snapping the Navy out of its
>>> post-Pearl Harbor funk).
>>>
>>>
>>> Joe Connor
>>>
>>>>
>>>> ________________________________
>>>>
>>>> From:Ray Fantini <RAFANTINI at salisbury.edu>
>>>> To: "Military Surplus Mail List (milsurplus at mailman.qth.net)"
>>>> <milsurplus at mailman.qth.net>
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:15 AM
>>>> Subject: [Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Within the context of war plan orange and the Japanese response to
>>>> that plan along with the IJN love of the idea of the great decisive
>>>> battle the attack on Pearl Harbor was both a tactical and strategic
>>>> success. The key to orange was for the US pacific fleet to marshal,
>>>> sail across the pacific, fight a decisive battle agents the IJN
>>>> fleet with battleships and blockade the Japanese mainland. I know I
>>>> left a lot out like relieving the Philippines but that's the short
>>>> version.
>>>> Prewar Japanese plans in response to orange committed IJN
>>>> submarines and aircraft carriers to strike at the US fleet while it
>>>> was in rout across the pacific but still counted on a decisive
>>>> battle being fought by battleships for control of the home waters.
>>>> The attack on Pearl Harbor exceeded the Japanese requirements by
>>>> removing US pacific fleet battleships as a factor. The problem was
>>>> that this was going to be a new war not fought with battleships but
>>>> with aircraft carriers and the Kantai Kessen theory of decisive
>>>> battles proved to be false with the war turning into a long hard
>>>> fought event.
>>>> The attack on Pearl Harbor may be one of the most successful and
>>>> well executed battles ever fought, true that long term strategic
>>>> outcome was a disaster for japan, but that day in fulfilling prewar
>>>> requirements the IJN hit the ball out of the park.
>>>>
>>>> Ray F
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>>>>
>>>
>>>
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