[Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?

[J. Forster]

The command, control, and RADAR tactics were developed, successfully, by
the RAF in the Battle of Britain...  over a year BEFORE Pearl Harbor.

YMMV,

-John

==================


> Still think you have to consider the whole Japanese concept of the
> decisive battle and how deeply it is ingrained in many of their actions,
> also perhaps it just human nature that in every war people start out with
> the idea that it's going to be just like the last war and often hold on to
> obsolete tactics. It's easy for us today to see the aircraft carrier as
> the ultimate weapon system but think many as late as pearl harbor or
> afterwards still held on the outmoded belief that the battleship was king.
> Maybe at the battle of the Coral Sea and definitely by Midway everyone
> knew that the day of the battleship was thru but before the war bet there
> were many battleship proponents, after all how much did japan spend on
> building Yamoto and Musahi?
> I would think an interesting point to look at is the differences between
> the poor use of radar and communications that was presented at Pearl
> Harbor and how by the battle of the Coral Sea we had developed the
> capability to spot incoming flight by radar  and vector intercept aircraft
> to attack incoming flights before reaching our carriers. Great example of
> command, control and communications just five months after pearl harbor.
>
> RF
>
> From: Joe Connor [mailto:joeconnor53 at yahoo.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 11:11 AM
> To: Ray Fantini; Military Surplus Mail List (milsurplus at mailman.qth.net)
> Subject: Re: [Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
>
> Short-term, yes; long-term, no.
>
> Yamamoto had traveled in the U.S. and understood our potential industrial
> might better than any other Japanese leader. He knew that he could run
> wild for the first six months of the war, before we could harness our
> industrial strength. He was understandably wary of "waking the sleeping
> giant." Therefore, he knew he needed a knock-out punch at Pearl Harbor. He
> scored a knock-down, not a knock-out.
>
> The psychological effects of the attack are interesting, too. On the one
> hand, the sneak attack rallied the American people like nothing else could
> have done. On the other hand, it scared the crap out of our admirals. The
> resulting timidity cost us any chance to relieve or reinforce Wake Island
> and any chance to bring badly needed help to the Philippines.(By the time
> of Coral Sea and Midway, of course, Nimitz had gone a long way towards
> snapping the Navy out of its post-Pearl Harbor funk).
>
>
>                                 Joe Connor
>
> ________________________________
> From: Ray Fantini
> <RAFANTINI at salisbury.edu<mailto:RAFANTINI at salisbury.edu>>
> To: "Military Surplus Mail List
> (milsurplus at mailman.qth.net<mailto:milsurplus at mailman.qth.net>)"
> <milsurplus at mailman.qth.net<mailto:milsurplus at mailman.qth.net>>
> Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:15 AM
> Subject: [Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
>
>
> Within the context of war plan orange and the Japanese response to that
> plan along with the IJN love of the idea of the great decisive battle the
> attack on Pearl Harbor was both a tactical and strategic success. The key
> to orange was for the US pacific fleet to marshal, sail across the
> pacific, fight a decisive battle agents the IJN fleet with battleships and
> blockade the Japanese mainland. I know I left a lot out like relieving the
> Philippines but that's the short version.
> Prewar Japanese plans in response to orange committed IJN submarines and
> aircraft carriers to strike at the US fleet while it was in rout across
> the pacific but still counted on a decisive battle being fought by
> battleships for control of the home waters.
> The attack on Pearl Harbor exceeded the Japanese requirements by removing
> US pacific fleet battleships as a factor.  The problem was that this was
> going to be a new war not fought with battleships but with aircraft
> carriers and the Kantai Kessen theory of decisive battles proved to be
> false with the war turning into a long hard fought event.
> The attack on Pearl Harbor may be one of the most successful and well
> executed battles ever fought, true that long term strategic outcome was a
> disaster for japan, but that day in fulfilling prewar requirements the IJN
> hit the ball  out of the park.
>
> Ray F
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