[Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?

[Joe Connor]

Short-term, yes; long-term, no.

Yamamoto had traveled in the U.S. and understood our potential industrial might better than any other Japanese leader. He knew that he could run wild for the first six months of the war, before we could harness our industrial strength. He was understandably wary of "waking the sleeping giant." Therefore, he knew he needed a knock-out punch at Pearl Harbor. He scored a knock-down, not a knock-out.

The psychological effects of the attack are interesting, too. On the one hand, the sneak attack rallied the American people like nothing else could have done. On the other hand, it scared the crap out of our admirals. The resulting timidity cost us any chance to relieve or reinforce Wake Island and any chance to bring badly needed help to the Philippines.(By the time of Coral Sea and Midway, of course, Nimitz had gone a long way towards snapping the Navy out of its post-Pearl Harbor funk).


                                Joe Connor



>________________________________
> From: Ray Fantini <RAFANTINI at salisbury.edu>
>To: "Military Surplus Mail List (milsurplus at mailman.qth.net)" <milsurplus at mailman.qth.net> 
>Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:15 AM
>Subject: [Milsurplus] Japan's Pearl Harbor Blunders?
> 
>
>Within the context of war plan orange and the Japanese response to that plan along with the IJN love of the idea of the great decisive battle the attack on Pearl Harbor was both a tactical and strategic success. The key to orange was for the US pacific fleet to marshal, sail across the pacific, fight a decisive battle agents the IJN fleet with battleships and blockade the Japanese mainland. I know I left a lot out like relieving the Philippines but that's the short version. 
>Prewar Japanese plans in response to orange committed IJN submarines and aircraft carriers to strike at the US fleet while it was in rout across the pacific but still counted on a decisive battle being fought by battleships for control of the home waters.
>The attack on Pearl Harbor exceeded the Japanese requirements by removing US pacific fleet battleships as a factor.  The problem was that this was going to be a new war not fought with battleships but with aircraft carriers and the Kantai Kessen theory of decisive battles proved to be false with the war turning into a long hard fought event.
>The attack on Pearl Harbor may be one of the most successful and well executed battles ever fought, true that long term strategic outcome was a disaster for japan, but that day in fulfilling prewar requirements the IJN hit the ball  out of the park.
>
>Ray F
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