[Milsurplus] Re: British Army Radio During WWII

Hue Miller [email protected]
Fri, 23 May 2003 13:22:42 -0700


----- Original Message ----- 
From: <[email protected]>

> One writer in ER a number of years 
> ago characterized the design philosophy as being "just good enough" as opposed 
> to the "every radio a Cadillac" view on our side.   Maybe "just good enough" 
> wasn't good enough.......
> 
> Also, wonder if the shortcomings were primarily techincal or organizational?
> 
> In reading the memoirs and biographies of our generals (Eisenhower, Bradley, 
> Stillwell,   etc.) I've been struck by the fact that communications matters, 
> good and/or bad, never seem to come up.   

A quote from "War Pilot: True Tales of Combat and Adventure",
Richard Kirkland, 1999, in Ballentine paperback:

( Returning from a raid over the Philippines, flying a P-38, to a small island 

"I called again a few minutes later. There was still no answer,
and more ominously, no radio chatter, which i should be able
to hear because the flights would be assembling over the
rendezvous point for the return.
I knew now that my radio was dead. It was a stroke of bad
luck, because our radios were relatively dependable, considering
their vintage. Generally, radio failures were caused by 
interference from lead....
....I reduced power and set RPM at 1600 for maximum range....
Then i got out my map and calculated the mag heading from
where I was to where I guessed the island was - a precision
navigation procedure."

This is an EXCELLENT book if you are interested in this
topic area. Excellent value for money- this is firsthand, not
some historian's recapitulation.

"Our course took us west over New Guinea and out into the
Ceram sea. It was dead-reckoning navigation, with no radio
aids of any kind. That's the way we did it in that war. Just take
up a mag heading on the compass and hope for the best".

( Apparently the author, in the USAAF, was not aware the
Navy was using the YG/ZB homing system for its carrier
operations.)

In chapter called "Chopper Down", author describes helicopter
rescue flight near Inchon, Korea, in fall 1951, "believed to have
been the first emergency use of the URC-4 in the Korean War. 

Oh, and on the radios reliability thing: I have read firsthand
accounts from Japanese fighter pilots that their radios were
considered very unreliable, and in fact some pilots removed
them. So, no radio, no DF, just compass.
-Hue Miller