[ARC5] History and Context of the ARC-5 sets

[Leslie Smith]

Hello Jim & Group,
Your point in the posting below was the adoption of divergent strategies in two  organizations - the Army Signal Corps and the US Navy.  The Army dealt in-house, you say.  The Navy depended on external expertise.  That seems to be your point, if I understand you correctly.

We see echoes of this today in business schools - get expertise in your "core business" and sub-contract the rest "out" is commonly taught.    This strategy speaks to economy at the expense of expertize.  Knowledge is expensive.   Those organizations that tend to internalize development (in your example the Army Signal Corps) cost more to run, but tend to retain internal expertize.  Local expertize can give significant advantages in assessing the viability of equipment & co - but at a cost.  Finding the point of balance between the two alternatives is a matter for fine judgment.  It's very interesting.  

An example of this (a non-radio example) was the decision by the Australian Army to develop the Owen sub-machine gun during WWII, the Korean War and even in Vietnam (at the beginning).  We could have used the American Thompson, which fired a heavier bullet, but was less reliable than the Owen, and more expensive.  We could have used the British Sten, which was reputed to cost only (LSD2/8/7), but was considered to be unreliable.    Certainly it cost a good deal to develop the Owen, and in the end we only made about 50,000 of these.  On the front line, in service, the Owen was loved by all who got hold of one.  Even the US vets preferred this little Aussie thing, that fired .38 ammunition (much lighter than the .45 from the Thompson).  The Owen was renowned for reliability.  Owens never jam, they say.  There are advantages from in-house expertise.

Returning to radio, given the difficulties experienced by various companies or teams involved in development work (e.g. VHF sets) and the significant role of radio communication in WWII, it's quite possible to imagine that battles were be won (or lost) depending on choice of strategy.  Certainly the failure of a radio in a Jap reconnaisance aircraft affected Midway.  

Very interesting point Jim.

Les


> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Jim Haynes <jhhaynes at earthlink.net>
> To: "Discussion of AN/ARC-5 military radio equipment." <arc5 at mailman.qth.net>
> Subject: Re: [ARC5] History and Context of the ARC-5 sets
> Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2010 10:07:33 -0500 (CDT)
> 
> 
> Another part of the story that comes through from reading the official
> WW-II history books, the volumes on the Signal Corps, is that in the
> Army the Signal Corps had the philosophy of developing whatever equipment
> was needed and then putting the design out to industry for production.
> The Air Corps was more interested in buying a system off the shelf -
> hence their demand for copying the English air defense system equipment.
> 
> There are other instances of the Navy being ahead of the Army.  I just
> read the biography of Arthur Collins, where it says that the Navy was a
> good customer of Collins pre-WW-II.  Collins tried to sell to the Army
> and got the brush-off.  Later when the Army wanted to buy Collins
> equipment he told them to place their orders through the Navy.
> Then there is a book "America's pursuit of precision bombing, 1910-1945"
> which deals with the Norden bomb sight, and how the Navy carried the
> ball for a long time in this development.
> 
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