[ARC5] HF/VHF Again (Was ".... Transmitter Dial)
David Stinson
arc5 at ix.netcom.com
Wed Jul 9 11:21:58 EDT 2008
----- Original Message -----
>... he told me they practically never used HF !....
I don't doubt you're vet's honesty;
only his sixty-five-year-old memory,
which is reflective of the last months of the war,
and doubtless that's what he remembers.
The Navy's own history and official documents say
that VHF was not general or even widely available
until *after* Leyte Gulf.
While it was installed in many fighter aircraft
from mid-1944 on, it was still a "half-baked" system.
This is confirmed in the documentation.
According to Leyte Gulf after-action reports,
while VHF was installed in fighter aircraft and
on some vessels, the ships that were supposed to direct
and control the aircraft had makeshift installations at best,
proving that VHF was not a fully-operational aircraft comm
system in the fleet until some time after this.
That wasn't unusual;
The "official" books usually came out long after
the men in the field had cobbled something together.
DOCUMENTATION.
>From After-Action Reports for Leyte Gulf, Oct. 1944.
Quotes, with my notes and emph.:
ComCruDiv 13 comments:
"....3. The lack of a dependable shipborne VHF installation is
another source of inconvenience and loss of military efficiency.
**** With only the makeshift installation of two AN/ARC-4 aircraft
VHF radio units, it is not felt that the Flagship's CIC installation
is properly equipped to handle the fighter direction
and intercept work frequently encountered. ****
(even the Flagship lacked an operational-level,
surface-to-air VHF installation. Many support vessels
are report to be equipped with nothing but unreliable TBYs,
or, more usually, no VHF at all)....
**** During the past 10 months, however, this division
has not had opportunity or the necessary equipment
to remedy these and other discrepancies in the material
installations of the communications department. *****"
(So, even 10 months *after* October of 1944,
the Navy *still* lacked the gear and people to install
operational-level, "by the book" VHF surface-to-air
communications in their ships.
Well, they certainly weren't talking to them by semaphore
or using a big sling-shot to fling notes at them.
I didn't say it; the commanders who where there said it).
Again- don't take it from me; listen to the commanders:
CTU 77.4.3 comments:
"*** To meet the additional traffic load required aboard a flagship,
an *ATC,* ten channel, high frequency aircraft transmitter was installed
and set up on the ten frequencies most likely to be used.
This proved an excellent addition,
*especially for communications with aircraft*....."
CTG 77.4 comments and recommends:
"1. The multiplicity of voice circuits required by the air support
frequency plan
presented a serious problem of coordination and control. In order to
integrate
the problem a complete Support Air Radio Center (SARC) was installed
in a compartment connecting with CIC. The set-up worked so
satisfactorily
that it should be made standard in all carriers assigned to support
missions. ....
2. The nets guarded in the SARC during the LEYTE operations included:
Inter CSA, Local Air Warning, General Warning,
Inter Fighter Director, Air-Sea rescue, Support Air Direction,
Support Air Request, and Search and Attack.
>>>>*****All of these were HF circuits. *****<<<<<"
(emph. mine, obviously. ;-)
3. To cover these circuits a total of eight receivers were made
available.
Nine would have been more satisfactory. All must be installed in SARC
and must cover ****medium and high frequency bands.****
4. Transmitters available to SARC included one TBL, one TCE
and one *ATC aircraft transmitter* pre-set for all required frequencies.
The correct installation would be two TBL and one push button
transmitter
pre-set to ten frequencies."
And for such a "wonderful improvement" as aircraft VHF,
it got low marks from the commanders, again showing that,
at this time, aircraft VHF was not yet "ready for prime time":
CTG 77.4:
"1. There is always the problem of insufficient VHF channels
and "jammed' frequencies..... the presence of three distinct carrier
groups
complicated the problem even more.
....their air groups interfered both with the carriers and each other.
The jamming of the fighter Director channel was particularly noticeable.
There were many times when all three groups were giving vectors
to their planes at the same time, with confusion of the fighters hearing
vectors from all three controlling bases and
the bases hearing acknowledgments from all the planes....
3. At the present time, the four generally used VHF frequencies
are so close together on the band that it is almost impossible to avoid
interference between channels. This is particularly noticeable
in channels #2, 3 and 4. Since there is a difference of only .72 mcs.
Between the three channels, the elimination of this interference is
difficult..."
CTG 38.1 Raid 7
"....7. Communications for the most part were not sufficiently reliable
for fighter direction. In the case of the night fighters, communications
were generally most unsatisfactory. ....The number of planes in the air
on the same channels is continuously increasing.
***Communication facilities have not been provided to the
extent necessary to keep pace with the ever-increasing necessities
of large scale air operations.*** Failure to provide the equipment
and trained upkeep personnel will result in
ship-air communications breakdown with consequent inability
to intercept enemy aircraft. ...
Regardless of how good radio discipline is, it is obvious that a
thousand stations on one circuit can only result in massed confusion."
I have some original aircraft radio logs.
They show continuous HF use throughout the flights.
Aircraft Sectionals from that time show continuous, active HF circuits.
All this, plus mountains of other data is, at least to me,
conclusive, period, case closed.
I'll say it again: VHF did not "replace" HF.
They were concurrent-use systems; not in every aircraft,
but in every theater, throughout the war.
D.S.
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